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COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - REGULATION OF
BILLBOARDS AND ADVERTISING STRUCTURES
FOR ESTHETIC PURPOSES
To what extent may a municipality regulate the erection of bill-
boards? The answer to the problem raised by this question should be
of special interest to all municipal residents whose cities have embarked
on post-war construction programs. The ends sought are not only
convenient and useful, but beautiful cities. Billboards and the type of
advertising methods associated with them, while they will not necessarily
affect the use of proposed improvements, will certainly prevent full
appreciation of their beauty. Masses of billboards along each express-
way, surrounding each new building; all vying for the passerby's
attention and seeking to attract it through the use of gaudy colors, tricky
limericks and suggestive photographs could quickly render the most
carefully designed of these projects unsightly.
The regulation of billboards and other structures for advertising
purposes or their absolute prohibition in designated areas by a municipal
corporation has generally been upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power delegated to a municipality by the state government. The courts
have usually found the municipality is protecting the safety, health,
morals or promoting the general welfare of its citizens and based their
decisions on removal of traffic hazards, prevention of accumulations of
combustible and unsanitary matter, removal of shields for criminal or
immoral acts, prevention of injury to passers-by through collapse of
billboards, or prevention of indecent or immoral advertising.' The
power to regulate is limited only by state and federal constitutional
requirements that the municipality's regulation be neither arbitrary or
unreasonable. 2 In construing the reasonableness of any particular
regulation the courts have usually required a substantial relation between
it and the maintenance of health, morals, safety and welfare of the
community.3
Since the majority of the courts have allowed a municipality to
regulate billboards, signs and other structures for advertising purposes
under the police power in order to preserve the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare it would be well to consider this power as
'Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 190, 61 L. Ed. 472,
L.R.A. 1918A, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 594 (1917), affirming 267 Ill. 344, 108 N.E.
340, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 488 (1915); Cream City Bill Posting Co. v. Milwaukee,
158 Wis. 86, 147 N.W. 25 (1914) ; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis.
100, 147 N.W. 30 (1914) ; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indi-
anapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309, 72 A.L.R. 453 (1930); State v. Staples
157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112, 37 L.R.A. (NS) 696 (1911).
2 Stierle v. Rohmeyer, 218 Wis. 149, 260 N.W. 647 (1935) ; U.S. CoNsT., Amend.
14.
3 See 72 A.L.R. 453, 466 (Regulations Held Reasonable). See 72 A.L.R. 453,
469 (Regulations Held Unreasonable).
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it applies to our problem.4 Is it confined to definite subjects? Is it
flexible enough to allow regulation for purely esthetic considerations?
The exercise of the police power is not confined to set standards or
objectives, but changes as do the needs of the public. Objects within its
scope change as social, industrial or political development indicates their
inclusion is necessary2 Since there is no broad definition of its scope
its limits are determined in regard to the particular subject of its
exercise."
The majority of our American courts have refused to allow the
police power to be exercised for esthetic purposes. They have, as a
general rule, held such a regulation to be contrary to the Federal
Constitution in that it involves a taking of property without compen-
sation and, hence, violates the due process clause.
7
"Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and
indulgence rather than necessity, and it is necessity alone which
justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property
without compensation.""a
Some courts which have refused to allow regulation on esthetic
grounds alone have gone on to say such considerations may be part of
the reason for imposing the regulation." The Indiana Supreme Court
while saying billboards could not be prohibited along a boulevard merely
because they were unsightly added:
"But esthetic considerations enter into a great extent, as an
auxiliary consideration, where regulation has a real or reasonable
relation to safety, health, morals, or general welfare."
The court, in that decision, then proceeded to find that although the
billboards were of safe and sound construction and not nuisances per se,
a regulation prohibiting a sign within 500 feet of any park, parkway or
boulevard was valid. It would seem that esthetic considerations were
more than an auxiliary consideration in the decision.10 The Indiana
court's position is illustrative of that group of courts who although they
are unwilling to recognize that the police power is elastic enough to
allow a regulation on esthetic principles alone, have actually based their
decisions on those principles while stating that the regulation protects
4 Supra, note 1.
5 State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 140 P. 918; 11 AM. JUR. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§270 and cases there cited.
6 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) ; 11 AM.
JUR. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §253.
7Varney v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867, 21 L.R.A. (NS) 741; Curran Bill
Posting and Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 261, 27 L.R.A.
544 (1910) ; Anderson v. Shackelford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917) ; Passaic
v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising and Sign Printing Co., 72 N.J.R. 285,
62 At. 267, Ill. Am. St. Rep. 676, 5 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 995 (1905).
8 Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, supra, note 7.
9 McQUILLAN, MuN. CoRP. Sec. 24.382. (3rd. Ed.)
10 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, supra, note 1.
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safety, health or morals, no matter how remotely these are related to
the regulation's purpose.'"
Other courts, although reluctant to rule it is a valid exercise of the
police power to regulate on esthetic considerations alone, have said
that if no other point were present upon which they could base their
decisions such considerations would be sufficient.22 Since there is
nothing in the Federal constitution which guarantees a landowner the
right to maintain a sign designed to force itself upon public attention
and the Supreme Court has carefully refrained from deciding the police
power cannot be exercised to protect beauty, it is difficult to understand
this reluctance to state the true basis of their decisions.13
A few courts have taken what would seem to be the better approach
to the problem and recognize that regulations to improve or maintain the
beauty of a city are within the city's power. In a dissent to a 1937
New York decision Judge Finch expressed his view that the attitude
of the courts on this problem seems to be changing.'4 Some of the later
cases seem to sustain his views.'15 A 1940 New York decision upheld
an ordinance which in effect prohibited any and all types of vertical
signs on any building, over any street, highway or alley in the village,
and the court based its decision upon esthetic considerations. The court
declared:
"For years the courts have strained to sustain the validity of
regulatory or prohibitory ordinances of this character upon the
basis of the public safety. They decided that aesthetic consider-
ations could afford no basis for sustaining such legislation. Such
considerations were deemed to render an ordinance of this
character unconstitutional. But the views of the public change in
the passing of years. What was deemed wrong in the past is
looked upon very often as eminently proper. What was con-
sidered unreasonable in the past is very often considered perfectly
reasonable today. Among the changes which have come in the
viewpoint of the public is the idea that our cities and villages
should be beautiful and that the creation of such beauty tends to
11 Supra, Note 10, see also Murphy Inc. et. al. v. Town of Westport 131 Conn.
292. 40 A 2nd 177, 156 A.L.R. 568 (1944); Perlmutter et. al. v. Greene, 259
N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932).
32 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
193 N.E. 799 (1935) MCQUILLEN, supra, note 9, intimates that this conclusion
is supported by Nebbia v. People, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89
A.L.R. 1469 (1934), and cases cited and summarized in that decision.
U Gardner, Mass. Billboard Decision, 49 HARv. L. REV. 869 (1936).
'3 Mid-State Advertising Corporation v. Bond, 247 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E. (2d) 286,(1937) (Dissenting Opinion.).
25 New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 S. (2d) 129 (1941) (in which the
court sustained validity of ordinance forbidding display of advertising in
French and Spanish Quarter of New Orleans and said the preventing or
prohibiting of eyesores in such a locality was within the police power); Pre-
ferred Tires v. Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 374 (1940); Com.
v. Trimmer, 53 Dauph. Co. Rep. (Pa., 1942).
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the happiness, contentment, comfort, prosperity and general
welfare of our citizens.' 16
Another point to consider in determining a municipality's ability to
regulate billboards for esthetic considerations is the power of eminent
domain. When a city exercises the power of eminent domain it is taking
private property for public use, as compared to restricting the use of
property retained by the owner when it exercises the police power.
Judge Shaw very aptly pointed out this distinction between acting under
the police power and exercising the power of eminent domain in an
early Massachussetts case:
"This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the
right of a government to take and appropriate private property
to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can
be done only on condition of providing reasonable compensation
therefor ... (The owner) is restrained, not because the public
have occasion to make the like use, or to make any use of the
property, or to take any benefit or profit to themselves from it;
but because it would be a noxious use, contrary to the maxim,
sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas. It is not an appropriation
of the property to a public use, but the restraint of an injurious
private use by the owner, and is therefor not within the principle
of property taken under right of eminent domain. '1 7
A major requirement for exercising the power of eminent domain is
that the contemplated use be for the public's benefit; however, it has
been determined that it is not necessary that the entire community be
benefited by the use or contemplated improvement, nor must the
proposed improvement be a business necessity or convenience, but may
extend to matters of public health and enjoyment for purely esthetic
considerations. 8 The eminent domain power, however, can not afford a
practical solution to the problem because the cost would be prohibitive.
It has been suggested that the whole problem of esthetic considera-
tions can be by-passed if courts would decide that the billboard operators
are making a private use of a public thoroughfare and therefor subject
to regulation. 9 A 1915 decision raises that possibility:
"The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon
the use of private property as it does upon the use of the channels
of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the owner of
16 Preferred Tires v. Hempstead, supra, note 15.
17 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53, 85 et. seq. (1851).
I1 In Re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404, 28 A.L.R.
295 (1923); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W.Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105, L.R.A.
1915C, 981, (1914) (While holding couldn't establish a building line for
esthetic reasons under police power, the court discussed the possibility of up-
holding such a statute under power of eminent domain and seemed to inti-
mate that such was possible, although it didn't actually decide it was.)
'19 Wilson, Billboards and Right to be Seen From the Highway, 30 GEo. LAW J.
743.
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private property, who so vigorously objects to the restriction of
his form of advertising, should require the advertiser to post his
posters upon the billboards so that they would face the interior of
the property instead of the exterior. Billboard advertising would
die a natural death if this were done, and its real dependency
not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the
unrestricted use of the public highways is at once apparent.
Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value
of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares.
Hence, we conceive the regulation of billboards is not so much a
regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of
streets and other public thoroughfares."20
Conclusion: The courts should recognize that a municipality may
impose regulations based on esthetic considerations and acknowledge
that maintaining the beauty of a municipality is sufficient justification
for the regulation. Such a frank recognition would not open the door
to a mass of restrictions concerning individual property nor prevent
individual enjoyment of property. The courts could consider the general
neighborhood in which the municipality seeks to prohibit billboards and
whether their prohibition in that area would add to the municipality's
beauty so as to increase "the happiness, contentment, comfort, pros-
perity, and general welfare of its citizens." As the size of our cities
increase and more of our population concentrates in them, our courts
should recognize that their citizens have a right to beautiful surround-
ings and should not be forced to look at advertising in every leisure
moment. As our civilization progresses our courts' idea of what is a
luxury and what is a right should change. Regulations of this type
would be limited as are all other exertions of the police power, in that
they could not be arbitrary nor unreasonable in relation to the end
sought.
DENNIs H. WILLms
20 Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 P.I. 586, 600, 609 (1915).
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